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SHARED-USE MINING INFRASTRUCTURE

SHARED-USE
INFRASTRUCTURE

A PRICKLY PARTNERSHIP TAKES ROOT

48 | NOVEMBER - DECEMBER | 2012

Skypixel | Dreamstime.com

Business

In association with:

Shared use of extractive
industry infrastructure
investments can be a
catalyst for inclusive and
sustainable growth in
Africa. Perrine Toledano
explores how
nly about 30% of Africa has
access to electricity, and
transport costs in Africa are
among the highest in the
world. For the World Bank,
the annual funding gap for infrastructure
investment in Africa is US $31 billion.
This gap however can be filled if
the investments of natural resource
concessionaires are leveraged and
not planned in an enclave model. In
resource-rich but infrastructure-poor
Africa, natural resource concessionaires
have traditionally developed railways,
ports and power plants to serve their
own needs. Africa has therefore often
missed the opportunity of coordinating
those large investments with national
infrastructure planning and has failed
to promote potential synergies and
shared use of the privately developed
infrastructure.
“As has been the case for many years,”
says Helen Tarnoy, Executive Director
of Aldwych International Ltd, “there
is a wealth of potential opportunities
for power developers owing to the
substantial unmet demand for reliable
power [including from the mining
industry] across the continent. The
opportunities are, however, not usually
structured or packaged in any way by
host governments or utilities.”
The potential to increase welfare gains
by improved coordination between
the government and companies is
therefore tremendous: from avoiding the
environmental damage of duplication of
infrastructure between competitors to
increasing the power supply to the grid,
to unlocking the agriculture sector by
providing cheaper transportation.
“We have to create complementary

O

infrastructure,” says Brian Molefe,
CEO of South Africa’s Transnet, “and
it is more likely to happen when the
complementing interests outweigh the
competing interests.” The cost savings
are nevertheless not always obvious to
the industry and barriers to shared use
are heavy. Only a sound regulatory and
policy framework can lift them.

KEY BARRIERS

Large infrastructure investments, such as
in railways, ports, hydro-electric plants
and power networks, exhibit natural
monopoly features with high fixed costs
and low operating costs. Consequently,
the marginal cost is below the average
cost and both decline as output expands.
It causes a tricky situation where prices
cannot be set at the marginal cost as
required by social efficiency because
prices must be at least equal to the
average cost in order for the endeavour to
be commercially viable. In this situation,
it is generally more economically efficient
for one firm to supply all the market’s
demand. The flip side is that it ends up in
exclusive access or monopoly pricing for
infrastructure services.
This explains why, in Africa, the
traditional model, where the mine owner
has been granted the vertically integrated
concession of the railways (and thus is
responsible for all the capital expenditure
as well as the operations and maintenance
of the assets), has not been successful
in achieving shared use even if the state
has kept the ownership of the tracks to
preserve the “national interests.”
Separating ownership of the mine,
railway and port infrastructure is a
more efficient structural solution: if
the owner of the infrastructure assets
is different from the mine investor,
the owner is incentivised to maximise
capacity utilisation, (provided that there
is sufficient capacity), which should
naturally result in shared use.
Separating the ownership is
particularly necessary in the cases
in which the government is faced
temporarily with one mining investor in
a promising mining area that is bound to
attract many other miners (e.g Liberia
with Arcelor Mittal); or with major
companies that can afford the total

infrastructure costs and that do not see
a business case for sharing the upfront
capital costs (e.g Mozambique with Vale).
But this separation of ownership is
not appealing to bulky miners, such as in
coal and iron ore, which consider their
infrastructures as part of an integrated
system on which they want close control
and zero coordination costs.
Those coordination costs are particularly
high in the case of sharing the railways
with non-mineral users, such as farmers,
given that they are generally low volume
and dispersed and that the logistic
solutions are not in place to make multipurpose infrastructure economically viable
(warehouses, loading stations, feeder
roads).
In Australia, in the coal Hunter Valley,
to cope with the coordination costs
associated with separated ownership, an
independent supply chain coordinator
has been established to communicate
with all participants in the supply
chain to maximise overall throughput
from the mine to the shipping entity.
In Africa, such a critical coordinating
body doesn’t exist. It is only in the DRCZambian copper belt, where one single
copper mine cannot afford a dedicated
line, where the model of separating
ownership has been adapted and that
shared use is achieved in practice.
An additional factor of high
coordination costs is Africa’s single-track
railway system, a remnant of colonial
times, that mining companies rarely
transform into double-track given the
high investment.
More critically, mine investors generally
have little regulatory incentive to design
infrastructure with greater capacity
than their mine’s production, such as
establishing the right of way, bridging
bases, making cuttings bigger, let alone
constructing assets with overcapacity.
Pointed questions regarding payment and
allocation of capacity are bound to arise
with generally no regulatory answers.
For instance, in Richards Bay, while the
railway is government-owned (Transnet),
the coal terminal at the port is owned by
the major coal mine investors, and it is
therefore difficult for other coal producers
to obtain capacity allocations at the port.
Consequently, those other coal producers
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do not seek access to the railways, so
shared access is not achieved in practice.
The same goes for the electricity
generated by the mine: appropriate
legislation for mining companies’ power
generation does not always exist, or
does not address the possibility of
selling electricity to the grid, whereas
the challenge for host countries with
expensive grid electricity is to increase
domestic supply. When there is no grid,
the issue is even more acute.
AngloGold Ashanti financed a new
electric power line from Siguiri mine
to the nearby town and provided two
generators, giving the community 1.2MW.
An engineer at one of leading mining
firms insists that the crucial question is
“who pays for the maintenance? Who
ensures the financial sustainability? It
can’t be the company.”
Even where regulations mandate shared
use or third party access, governments
faced with monopolistic structures rarely
have the bargaining power to impose such
terms. To cope with this, countries like
India or Brazil have adopted the golden
share approach to influence or veto key
strategic decisions.
Finally, weakly drafted contractual
language between states and private
investors has proved ineffective in
ensuring shared use or third party
access, particularly when the designated
infrastructure is capacity constrained.
According to Miguel Peres, Managing
Director, Mozambique at Brazil-based
Odebrecht, the absence of an efficient
statutory access regime or of an
independent regulator to refer to, to
regulate the monopolies, “is the number
one barrier to shared use.”

A CHANGE IS COMING

With the increase in commodity prices as
well as the fact that the African continent
has proved its attractiveness, the race
to attract investments is coming to an
end. Africa is becoming more demanding
towards the investor.
For instance, the Mozambique and
Malawi governments have been reluctant
to let Vale develop the Nacala Corridor
given their intention to keep exclusive
access. Mozambique’s Minister of
Transportation and Communication,
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Paul Zucula, is adamant: Nacala’s rail
and port concession granted to Vale
“will also serve for the transportation
of passengers and diverse merchandise,
including livestock, in the agricultural
region comprising the northern corridor.”
In Liberia, the 2010 contract signed
for the Putu mine requires the mine
owner to build infrastructure with excess
capacity and to provide 24/7 electricity
to local communities in a ten-kilometre
radius around the mine site.
In the DRC, in 2005, the public
utility SNEL cancelled its deal with
MagIndustries, whose plan was to
rehabilitate turbines in exchange for
power for its mining operations, when
realising the unfavorable terms of the
deal: negligible additional capacity for
the country and the country had to pay
the equivalent of a 26.5% financing
interest for the Inga I and II upgrades.

“[Complimentary
infrastructure] is more
likely to happen when the
complimenting interests
outweigh the competing
interests”

In Guinea, with the new 2011 mining
code, the government requires an equity
stake in the infrastructure projects to
limit the exercise of monopoly power.
In addition, governments are issuing
new laws and regulations facilitating
coordination and partnership with the
companies. Mozambique recently passed
a PPP law. In South Africa and Cameroon,
reforms are underway to unbundle
the power sector and encourage the
participation of the mining industry’s
own-generation in the power market.
Furthermore, with the steady
increase in commodity prices, mining
has expanded and few mining projects
happen in isolation, making the
business case to coordinate and share
infrastructure with other mineral users
clearer.
The Mbalam Iron Ore Railway
developed by Sundance Resources in
Cameroon and the Rio Tinto Simfer
railways in Guinea, for example, are

expected to open to other operators on
a fee-for-service basis. Rio Tinto in the
coal corridor in Mozambique is seeking
to develop a new railway with other coal
competitors under a multi-user scheme
where capital costs are shared.
To implement multi-user platforms,
“it is unrealistic to expect all projects
within a region to be ready at the same
time, therefore one needs an anchor
project justifying the railway investment
and the railway [must be] designed to be
expanded to accommodate other projects
as they develop” says Ewen Wigley, Head
of Corporate Development at Africa Iron
Ore Group.

PROPER PLANNING IS
NEEDED

Independent from a weak regulatory
framework or companies’ reluctance
towards shared use is the issue of the
proximity of population and activity
centres. For instance, with the support
of the World Bank, the government of
Madagascar created a joint venture with
Rio Tinto to develop the port of Ehoala.
Rio Tinto’s operated port is multi-purpose
but “as the port is remote from other
economic activity, container-shipping
activity is extremely modest (15,000 TEU
over the past three years), so in effect it
only serves Rio Tinto’s needs,” contends
Henry Pringle, a port specialist.
Therefore, requiring shared use and open
access from mining investments cannot
save on the effort of national infrastructure
planning to identify where the publicprivate coordination makes more sense.
This planning effort seldom happens in
Africa but is indispensable to unlock the
economic potential of the continent.
To help this planning effort, a ten-year
aspirational map can be a useful tool that
would indicate the infrastructure necessary
for national development by 2023, and
would anticipate the demand for various
forms of infrastructure by assessing the
potential economic activity.
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